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0.  Introduction" 
When is a Reflexive not a Reflexive? 
Near-reflexivity and Condition R 
Jeffrey Lidz 
University of Delaware 
Anaphors are standardly divided into two classes: local and long-distance. These 
anaphors are distinguished by the domain in which they must be bound; local anaphors 
require an antecedent within a smaller domain than long-distance anaphors do. This 
partitioning of anaphors is based strictly on syntactic behavior and the tacit asswnption that 
anaphors form a single semantic class, i.e., the class of referentially deficient elements. In 
this paper I put this asswnption into question, illustrating the existence of a semantic 
distinction among anaphor types which cross-cuts the local/long-distance partition. While 
it is true that all anaphors are referentially dependent, I will show that some anaphors 
require complete identity with their antecedents while others allow their referential identity 
to be determined from that of their antecedents without requiring extensional equivalence. 
Anaphors of the first class, which I call Pure-reflexives, identify the same entity in the 
world as their antecedents do. Anaphors from the second class, which I call Near­
reflexives, do not require complete identity with their antecedents; the referent of a Near­
reflexive can be loosely related to the referent of its antecedent by certain kinds of similarity 
to be made more precise below. This distinction between Pure- and Near-reflexives has 
consequences for the theory of reflexive predicates and in conjunction with this theory 
enables us to explain the existence of anaphors which appear to resist binding by a 
coargument Antilocal anaphors are Pure-reflexives while any anaphor which can be 
bound by a coargwnent is a Near-reflexive. Near-reflexives are not exclusively locally 
bound, however. Some Near-reflexives can also be long-distance bound. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 1 I discuss the predicate-centered 
binding theory of Reinhart and Reuland (1993). In section 2 I show that some sentences 
which are predicted to be synonymous by this theory are not synonymous. In section 3 I 
explicate the notion of Near-reflexivity. In section 4 I introduce Condition R, which 
replaces the binding conditions of Reinhart and Reuland, and I show several places where 
it makes more accurate predictions than their binding conditions. 
• This paper has benefited from discussions with many friends and colleagues, who should be thanked but 
not blamed. These include: Abdellatif Alghadi, R. Amritavalli, Tonia Bleam, Luigi Burzio, Peter Cole, 
Bob Frank, Gaby Hermon, K.A. Jayaseelan, Alexander Lehrmann, K. V. Tirumalesh, Pierre Pica, Tom 
Purnell, Tanya Reinhart, Eric Reuland, Bert Xue. This work was supported in part by NSF Grant #BNS-
9121 1 67. 
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1 .  Predicate-centered Binding Theory 
The theory of reflexivity in generative grammar has traditionally been a theory of 
nominal types. NPs are identified as anaphors, pronominals or R-expresssions on the 
basis of where in a given sentence elements which are coreferential with them can occur. 
The binding theory is thus a theory of the syntactic properties of referential dependence. 
Reinhart and Reuland (1993) (henceforth R&R) have recently argued against this strictly 
nominal approach to binding claiming instead that reflexivity is a property of predicates, 
that the role of reflexive pronouns in language is not to express coreference but rather to 
reflexivize predicates. The distribution of anaphors and pronominals is not determined by 
reference, a property of NPs, but by reflexivity, a property of predicates. From this 
predicate-centered perspective, an anaphor is still defined as an NP which is referentially 
deficient in the relevant respect, but the anaphors are broken into two types, those that 
reflexivize the predicates that they are arguments of and those that do not. This division is 
intended to capture the apparent antilocality of certain anaphors. That is, there are certain 
NPs which are referentially dependent but which require a long-distance antecedent and not 
a local one. For example, the Dutch anaphor zich must not be bound by a coargument, 
although it must be bound. The behavior of zich contrasts with that of zichzelf, which can 
be bound by a coargument but cannot be long-distance bound. 
( 1) a. *Max haat zich 
Max hates self 
'Max hates himself' 
b. Max haat zichzelf 
Max hates selfself 
'Max hates himself' 
c. Max hoorde mij over zich praten 
Max heard me about self talk 
'Max heard me talk about him 
d. *Max hoorde mij over zichzelf praten 
Max heard me about selfself talk 
'Max heard me talk about him' 
While both zich and zichzelf are anaphors in the sense that they require a c­
commanding antecedent, only zichzelf can reflexivize a predicate and so only zichzelf can 
be bound by a coargument Technically, this is implemented through the following binding 
conditions: 
(2) Condition A: A reflexive-marked predicate is reflexive 
Condition B: A reflexive predicate is reflexive-marked 
These conditions depend on the following definitions: 
(3) a. 
b.  
A predicate is  � iff it  has two coreferential arguments 
A predicate is reflexive-marked iff 
i) it is lexically reflexive; or 
ii) one of its arguments is a SELF anaphor 
(4) A SELF-anaphor is a morphologically complex anaphor 
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Returning now to the examples in (1), (Ia) is ungrammatical as a violation of 
Condition B. The predicate is reflexive (it has two coreferential arguments) but not 
reflexive-marked (it is not lexically reflexive and neither of its arguments is a SELF 
anaphor). Both conditions are satisfied in (lb); here the predicate is both reflexive and 
reflexive-marked (since one of its arguments is a SELF-anaphor). In the long-distance 
cases, ( Ic) trivially satisfies both conditions since there are no reflexive predicates and no 
reflexive-marked predicates, while (ld) violates Condition A because the embedded 
predicate is reflexive-marked (via the SELF anaphor) but not reflexive. 
The intuition behind R&R's proposal is that there is a one-to-one correspondence 
between a particular formal property (reflexive-marked) and a particular semantic property 
(reflexive). �t is important to note, however, that the definition of reflexive-marked is a 
disjunction; there are two ways for a predicate to be reflexive-marked. These two modes of 
reflexive-marking are required to explain the contrast in (5): 
(5) a. *Max haat zich 
Max hates self 
'Max hates himself 
b. Max wast zich 
Max washes self 
'Max washes himself 
Here we see that the restriction against coargument binding of zich depends on the 
predicate. Since the syntactic relation between the anaphor and its antecedent is identical in 
(5a) and (5b), but the binding possibilities for the two cases diverge, we can conclude that 
it is the predicate which detemiines the availability of coargument binding for the anaphor 
zich.1 Under the predicate centered binding theory outlined above, the effect is achieved by 
saying that some predicates are inherently reflexive and, thus, inherently reflexive-marked. 
While (5b) would appear to violate Condition B since the predicate is reflexive but not 
reflexive-marked, in fact the condition is satisfied because the predicate is lexically reflexive 
and thus does not need overt reflexive-marking via the SELF anaphor. 
Lidz (1995) extends the definition of lexically reflexive to include morphological 
reflexivity, i.e., to include those languages which have a morpheme which is required on 
reflexive predicates. In Kannada, for example, the anaphor tannu cannot be bound by a 
coargument in the absence of the verbal reflexive morpheme -koL: 
1 Pierre Pica (personal communication) objects to this characterization of the distinction between (5a) alKI 
(5b), claiming that in (5b) zich is a clitic and that like all clitics it must be locally bound. According to 
Pica. it is the variable status of zich as a clitic or a full NP which gives rise to the distinction. The 
objection is wrongheaded in two ways. First, if it is true that clitics are obligatorily locally bound, then we 
still need an explanation for why the clitic zich is possible in (5b) but not (5a). Since the predicale is the 
only thing that varies, then Pica's explanation reduces to properties of the predicate, as above. Second, it is 
not true that all clitics must be locally bound. Even when zich is long-distance bound, it behaves like a 
clitic in resisting topicalization and in blocking movement of the PP containing it (Everaert 1986): 
(i) • voor zich liet Jan Piet werken 
for self let Jan Piet work 
'For self, Jan let Piet work' (self=Jan) 
(ii) *Zij liet mij voor zich een huis bouwen 
She let me for self a house build 
'She let me build a house for her 
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*Hari tann-annu boDe-d-a 
Hari self-ACC hit-PST-3SM 
'Hari hit himself 
b. Hari tann-annu hoDe-du-koND-a 
Hari self-ACC hit-PP-REFL.PST-3SM 
'Hari hit himself 
Under this approach, (6a) is ungrammatical because the predicate is reflexive but 
not reflexive-marked, in violation of Condition B. In (6b), however, the verbal reflexive 
serves to morphologically reflexive-mark the predicate and so both binding conditions are 
met Thus, we see that reflexive marking can be achieved via a SELF anaphor or lexically, 
with some languages marking the lexically reflexive predicates morphologically. 
2. Against Reflexive-marked Predicates as a Natural Class 
R&R's approach makes an interesting prediction with respect to the meaning of 
reflexive-marked predicates. As noted above, reflexive-marking can be realized lexically 
(sometimes through a verbal affix) or syntactically (through a SELF anaphor). The binding 
conditions themselves, however, make no reference to the manner of reflexive marking. 
The binding conditions require only that reflexive-marking, no matter how it is realized, 
corresponds to semantic reflexivity. As a consequence, the theory predicts that reflexive­
marked predicates are semantically uniform. Since the binding conditions apply at LF and 
only make reference to reflexive-marking and not to the manner of reflexive-marking, it 
follows that these predicates are indistinguishable at LF. Semantically, reflexive-marked 
predicates should form a natural class. This prediction is not borne out, however. 
Predicates which are reflexive-marked by SELF anaphors have different semantic 
properties than predicates which are lexically reflexive-marked. That is, the one-to-one 
mapping between the semantic property of being reflexive and the formal property of being 
reflexive-marked breaks down when we examine the semantic properties of these two types 
of reflexive-marked predicate more closely. 
Consider first the Madame Tussaud context first discussed in Jackendoff 1992. 
Here, a famous person goes into the wax museum which contains a statue depicting her 
and then looks into the mirror. If the speaker describing this situation says (7a), then we 
get the interpretation that the person saw her own reflection in the mirror. But, if the 
speaker says (7b ), we get either the interpretation that the person saw her own reflection or 
the interpretation that the person saw a reflection of her statue (Reuland 1995): 
(7) a. w zag zich in een griewlige hoek staan 
she saw self in a creepy comer stand 
'She saw herself (=reflection, �tatue) in a creepy corner stand' 
b. w zag zichwlf in een griewlige hoek staan 
she saw selfself in a creepy comer stand 
'She saw herself (=reflection or statue) in a creepy corner stand' 
The fact that there is an additional reading available in the sentence in which the SELF 
anaphor occurs is not predicted by R&R's theory. 
This set of facts is found also in Kannada. When the verb is lexically reflexive-
marked (via the verbal reflexive), the statue interpretation is blocked. When the 
morphologically complex anaphor is present, however, this interpretation is available. 
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Hari tann-annu nod-i-koND-a 
Hari self-ACC see-PP-REFL.PST-3SM 
'Hari saw himself (=Hari, ;t:statue)' 
b .  Hari tann-annu-tanne nod-id-a 
Hari self-ACC-self see-PST-3SM 
'Hari saw himself (=Hari or statue)' 
255 
A second place where R&R's theory makes the wrong prediction is in comparative 
deletion constructions. Here again, all reflexive-marked predicates are predicted to behave 
alike but they do not The lexically reflexive-marked predicate allows only a sloppy 
interpretation while the syntactically reflexive-marked predicate allows either a strict or 
sloppy reading (Sells, Zaenen and Zec 1987): 
(9) a. zij verdedigde zich beter dan Peter 
she defended self better than Peter 
'She defended herself better than Peter defended himself 
'*She defended herself better than Peter defended her' 
b .  zij verdedigde zichzelf beter dan Peter 
she defended selfself better than Peter 
'She defended herself better than Peter defended himself 
'She defended herself better than Peter defended her' 
Similarly, for those speakers who allow comparative deletion in Kannada,2 when 
the verbal reflexive is present, only the sloppy reading is available: 
( 10) Rashmi Siita-ginta cheenage tann-annu singarisi-koLL-utt-aaLe 
Rashmi Sita-COMP better self-ACC beautify-REFL-NPST-3SF 
'Rashmi puts makeup on herself better than Sita puts makeup on herself 
'*Rashmi puts makeup on herself better than Sita puts makeup on her' 
Given that R&R's theory falsely predicts the semantic equivalence of the two types 
of reflexive-marked sentence, we need to find a way to capture their generalization that the 
antilocality of anaphors like zich and tannu is due to properties of the predicate without 
making the same false prediction. In order to do this, we must ftrst characterize the 
difference between the interpretations allowed in the syntactically reflexive-marked 
sentences and those of the lexically reflexive-marked sentences. 
3. Near-reflexives 
What the Madame Tussaud examples illustrate is that SELF anaphors allow an 
interpretation in which the anaphor is referentially dependent on its antecedent but not 
necessarily identical with it The anaphor can pick out an entity from the domain of 
discourse which is related to and similar to its antecedent We will call such anaphors 
"Near-reflexives." The difference between Near-reflexive predicates (i.e., predicates 
which have a Near-reflexive as an argument) and semantically reflexive predicates is given 
in (1 1): 
1 Most Kannada speakers require the verb to be repeated in comparative constructions. 
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( 1 1) a. 
b.  
AX [P(x,x)] 




( l la) indicates that the two arguments of the �redicate P are  identical. In ( l ib), the second 
argument is a function of the first argument These representations are formally distinct, 
although in most cases they are extensionally equivalent That is, the Near-reflexive 
function does not prohibit the antecedent and the anaphor from being the same entity in the 
world, although in the semantic representation they are distinguished. On the other hand, 
in a Pure-reflexive sentence, the anaphor and its antecedent must be completely identical, 
both in the world and in the semantic representation. 
Since lexically and morphologically reflexive predicates do not allow a non-identity 
interpretation, it follows that they are semantically reflexive, i.e., that they have the 
representation ( l la). Predicates which are reflexive-marked via a morphologically complex 
anaphor do permit the non-identity interpretation, and so implicate the semantic 
representation ( l lb). 
4. Condition R 
Given that the coargument restriction on anaphors like zich and tannu is obviated in 
the presence of lexicaYmorphological reflexivity and that lexical reflexivity is semantic 
reflexivity (i.e., lexical reflexives never allow the Near-reflexive interpretation of the 
anaphor), the following principle suggests itself: 





The left side of this formula depicts the semantic representation of reflexivity. The right 
side depicts the representation of the theta-grid of a lexically reflexive predicate. The 
condition states that if a predicate is semantically reflexive, then it must be lexically 
reflexive. Similarly, if a predicate is lexically reflexive, then it must be semantically 
reflexive. 
Let us now see how Condition R gives us the desired results. Consider the 
following: 
(13) a.  
b. 
c. 
•Hari tann-annu noDi-d-a 
Hari self-ACC see-PST-3SM 
'Hari saw himself 
Hari tann-annu noDi-du-koND-a 
Hari self-ACC see-PP-REFL.PST-3SM 
'Hari saw himself (=reflection, *Statue) 
Hari tann-annu-tanne noDi-d-a 
Hari self-ACC-self see-PST-3SM 
'Hari saw himself (=reflection or statue) 
(=8a) 
(=8b) 
' I leave open !he exact content of !he Near-reflexive function for !he time being, !hough most likely this 
function is probably something like "representation of (x):' See Jackendoff (1978; 1 992) and Fauconnier 
(1985) for some illuminating discussion. 
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(13a) is ruled out in violation of the left-to-right implication of Condition R; the sentence is 
semantically reflexive (since tannu does not introduce the Near-reflexive function) but not 
lexically reflexive. In (13b), the sentence is both semantically and lexically reflexive. The 
Near-reflexive interpretation is ruled out because the predicate is lexically reflexive (as 
evidenced through the verbal reflexive) and so must be semantically reflexive, by the right­
to-left implication of Condition R. Finally, in (13c) the anaphor introduces the Near­
reflexive function and so the sentence is not semantically reflexive. The predicate is not 
lexically reflexive either and so Condition R is not operative. 
4. 1 Predictions 
4. 1 . 1  All Coargument-bound Anaphors are Near-reflexives 
Condition R makes an interesting prediction: if an anaphor can be bound by a 
coargument (in the absence of lexical reflexivity), then that anaphor is a Near-reflexive. 
This prediction follows from Condition R because if a predicate is not lexically reflexive, 
then there is no way for it to be semantically reflexive. This prediction appears to be borne 
out in languages as diverse as English, Chinese and Russian. We consider these in turn. 
4. 1 . 1 . 1  English 
It is well known that the English anaphor himself can be bound by a coargument: 
( 14) John hit himself 
That this anaphor allows the Near-reflexive interpretation is clear (see Jackendoff 1992). 
Consider the situation in which there is a statue depicting John and he throws a football at it 
and hits it with the football. Here it is natural to say (15) and mean that John hit the statue 
that depicts him. 
(15) John hit himself with the football 
Of course, (15) does not force a statue-interpretation; it can be interpreted as John 
(the person) hitting John (the person) with the football. What this illustrates is that the 
entities picked out by the domain and the range of the Near-reflexive function can be 
identical even though they are distinguished in the semantic representation. 
4. 1 . 1 .2  Chinese 
Chinese has a morphologically simplex anaphor, ziji, which can be bound by a 
coargument, a prima facie counterexample to R&R's binding theory. Since only SELF 
anaphors can be locally bound and since SELF anaphors are defined as morphologically 
complex, R&R predict that ziji should be antilocal like zich and tannu. Of course, it is easy 
to imagine ways in which ziji can be construed as a SELF anaphor, either by altering the 
definition of SELF anaphor or by saying that ziji is covertly complex. Doing so, however, 
requires that there be two anaphors that are pronounced ziji, one a SELF anaphor and the 
other a SE anaphor. If there weren't two such anaphors, then we would expect either local 
binding all the time or long-distance binding all the time. 
On the other hand, Condition R, being independent of morphological form, 
correctly predicts that this anaphor is a Near-reflexive. The availability of both local and 
long-distance binding poses no problem for this analysis since binding domain is 
determined syntactically while the availability of the Near-reflexive interpretation is 
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nonsyntactic in nature. • Here imagine the situation where Mao Tse Tung goes into the wax 
museum and becomes enraged at seeing the statue depicting him. Here, we can say ( 16) to 
mean either that Mao committed suicide (shooting himself) or vandalism (shooting the 
statue): 
(16) Mao Tse Tung ba ziji qiangbi le 
Mao Tse Tung BA self shoot ASP 
'Mao Tse Tung shot himself (=statue or Mao)' 
We saw above that in Dutch, semantically reflexive sentences allow only a sloppy 
interpretation under Comparative Deletion while Near-reflexive sentences allow both a strict 
and sloppy interpretation. So, if ziji is a Near-reflexive, then it follows that it should allow 
both a strict and sloppy interpretation. The prediction is also borne out: 
(17) Zhangsan bi Lisi wei ziji bianhu de hao 
Zhangsan than Lisi for self defend DE well 
'Zhangsan defended himself better than Lisi defended himself 
'Zhangsan defended himself better than Lisi defended him' 
4. 1 . 1 .3  Russian 
Russian is a further interesting example from this perspective because, like 
Kannada, it has both an affixal reflexive as well as a morphologically simplex anaphor. 
Unlike Kannada, however, the morphologically simplex anaphor can be bound by a 
coargument in the absence of the affixal reflexive. Since the affixal reflexive is taken to 
indicate lexical reflexivity, it follows that when the verbal reflexive is absent the predicate 
cannot be lexically reflexive and thus not semantically reflexive. So, sentences with the 
anaphor bound by a coargument must have a Near-reflexive interpretation. This prediction 
is borne out. Imagine the situation described above for Mao Tse Tung, but with Boris 
Yeltsin as the protagonist When the verbal reflexive is present, the Near-reflexive 
interpretation is blocked (as predicted by Condition R). When the anaphor is present, the 
Near-reflexive interpretation is available: 
{ 18) a. Y eltsin zastrelil-sja 
Yeltsin shot-REFL 
'Yeltsin shot himself (=Yeltsin, ¢statue)' 
b. Yeltsin zastrelil sebja 
Y eltsin shot self 
'Yeltsin shot himself (=Yeltsin or statue}' 
Also as predicted by Condition R, in comparative deletion constructions when the 
verbal reflexive is present we get only the sloppy interpretation and when the anaphor is 
present we get both strict and sloppy interpretations: 
(19) a. Ivan zashchischal-sja lachshe chem Petr 
Ivan defended-REFL better than Peter 
'Ivan defended himself better than Peter defended himself 
'*Ivan defended himself better than Peter defended him' 
' I assume that the head-movement theory of refleltives (see Pica 1987; Cole, Hennon and Sung 1990 
among others) can explain the availability of long-distance binding. What is at issue here is the availability 
of coargument binding, which is precluded by Condition R unless the anaphor is a Near-refleltive. 
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b.  Ivan zashchischal sebja lachshe chem Petr 
Ivan defended self better than Peter 
'Ivan defended himself better than Peter defended himself 
'Ivan defended himself better than Peter defended him' 
4. 1 .2 Variation in lexical reflexivity 
259 
A second prediction made by Condition R has to do with the extent of lexical 
reflexivity found in a given language. Dutch and Kannada differ in that in Kannada any 
verb can be made lexically reflexive through the affixation of the verbal reflexive, while 
Dutch allows only a small set of lexically specified verbs to be lexically reflexive. We 
might thus expect to find a language which allowed no predicates to be lexically reflexive. 
Such a language, if it had an anaphor which did not permit a Near-reflexive interpretation, 
might block binding by a coargument across the board That is, in a language where there 
is no lexical reflexivity, we predict the existence of an anaphor which can never be bound 
by a coargument. Malayalam is such a language. The Malayalam simplex anaphor, tan, 
cannot be bound by a coargument whereas the complex anaphor tan-ne-tanne can 
(Mohanan 1982; Jayaseelan 1995): 
(20) a. *moohan tan-ne aaraaDhik'k'uNNu 
mahan self-Ace worships 
'Mohan worships himself 
b .  moohan tan-ne-tanne aaraDhik'k'uNNu 
mahan self-ACC-self worships 
'Mohan worships himself 
This generalization holds even with verbs which are lexically reflexive in other languages 
(K.A Jayaseelan, personal communication): 
(21) a. *raaman tan-ne kshauram ceytu 
raaman self-Ace shaving did 
'Raaman shaved' 
b .  raaman tan-ne-tanne kshauram ceytu 
raaman self-Ace-self shaving did 
'Raaman shaved himself 
Note also that (21b) allows the Near-reflexive interpretation that Raaman shaved a portrayal 
of himself, as predicted by Condition R. We can conclude that Malayalam has no lexical 
reflexivity. The fact that tan can never be bound by a coargument indicates that this 
anaphor does not express Near-Reflexivity and follows from the combination of lexical 
properties of Malayalam with Condition R. 
Under this conception, all variation in the behavior of reflexive forms found among 
the world's languages reduces to lexical variation. The syntactic binding theory is 
constant, as is Condition R. What varies is the extent of lexical reflexivity permitted by a 
language and the range of anaphors found in that language. The remaining question is 
what properties of the lexicon or of lexical items determines the extent of lexical reflexivity 
and whether a given anaphor allows a Near-reflexive interpretation. Note that although it is 
not clear at this point what linguistic property determines whether an anaphor introduces the 
Near-reflexive function, it should be trivial for a child learning the language to determine if 
an anaphor that he encounters does so. Assuming that the child knows which verbs are 
inherently reflexive and which verbs are not, then if the child sees an anaphor bound by a 
9
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coargument in the absence of lexical reflexivity, he can conclude that the anaphor is a Near­
reflexive. Thus, the child needs have no exposure to sentences involving wax museums 
and heads of state to determine whether a given form is a Near-reflexive. 
5 .  Conclusions 
In this paper I have shown that there are two classes of anaphor: Pure-reflexives 
and Near-reflexives. A Pure-reflexive anaphor requires complete identity with its 
antecedent while a Near-reflexive anaphor can be related to its antecedent via the Near­
reflexive function. The distinction between Pure- and Near-reflexives is independent of the 
distinction between local and long-distance anaphors. Further, those anaphors which have 
been characterized as antilocal in the past are really Pure-reflexives. Syntactically, they 
allow binding by a coargument; however, in the absence of lexical reflexivity these 
anaphors cannot be bound by a coargument without inducing Condition R, which requires 
semantically reflexive predicates to be lexically reflexive. Thus, we do not need a class of 
anaphors which are syntactically specified as being antilocal since the antilocality of such 
anaphors can be attributed to their semantic representations in conjunction with Condition 
R. The head-movement theory of Pica (1987), Cole, Hermon and Sung (1990) and others, 
naturally accounts for the difference between local and long-distance reflexives. As far as 
these theories are concerned, there is no difference between the so-called antilocal anaphors 
and other long-distance anaphors, since the antilocality effect is due to Condition R, which 
is part of the interface between the semantic component and the lexicon. This approach is 
superior to that of Reinhart and Reuland on several counts. First, their approach falsely 
predicts synonymy across reflexive-marked predicates. The distinction between Pure- and 
Near-reflexives is predicted by their theory not to exist Second, while tlie unavailability of 
long-distance binding for morphologically complex anaphors is captured by their theory, 
they also falsely predict that all local binding involves morphological complexity. That is, 
they predict all morphologically simplex anaphors to be antilocal. We have seen, however, 
that this prediction is too strong. What is true is that any anaphor (independent of 
morphological structure) which can be locally bound introduces the Near-reflexive function 
and thus averts Condition R. R&R's important observation that the behavior of antilocal 
anaphors is explained by properties of reflexive predicates and not by binding 
configurations is maintained in our approach. Condition R, however, has nothing to say 
about the behavior of anaphors that introduce the Near-Reflexive function. A 
characterization of these anaphors is still required. It seems clear that the distribution of 
these anaphors is best characterized in syntactic terms. Whether this is implemented 
through the classical binding theory of Chomsky (1981) or the chain-condition of Reinhart 
and Reuland (1993) remains to be seen. Finally, we note that a full account of the 
phenomena associated with anaphora and reflexivity in human language requires 
investigation of the syntactic, lexical and semantic components of the grammar and not any 
one of these alone. 
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